Situation in Mali

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2364 (2017), the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2018 and requested me to report on a quarterly basis on its implementation, focusing on progress in taking forward the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (see S/2015/364 and S/2015/364/Add.1) and the efforts of MINUSMA to support it. The present report contains updates with regard to major developments in Mali since my previous report (S/2018/273) and recommendations for the renewal of the mandate of MINUSMA, taking into account the findings and recommendations of the independent strategic review, led by Ellen Margrethe Løj, conducted in the first quarter of 2018.

II. Major political developments

2. During the period under review, the renewed momentum in the peace process brought about by the Prime Minister, Soumeïlou Boubèye Maïga, and the recently established sanctions regime and the appointment of an independent observer, contributed to progress in the implementation of the Agreement. Discussion continued on the appointments of interim authorities at the district and municipality levels, and the mixed units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Kidal and Timbuktu were established. The return of Malian armed forces to Kidal to join the mixed units is a significant step. Care must be taken to ensure that the momentum of the implementation of the road map is maintained throughout the campaigning period leading up to the presidential elections.

3. I was able to witness that progress during my visit to the country from 29 to 30 May. I was encouraged by the parties’ determination to work together to advance the implementation of the Agreement, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, ahead of the presidential elections in July. However, given the challenges facing the country, including the expansion of violent extremist and criminal groups, it is critical that the international community unite in support of Mali and address the crisis through a multidimensional, coordinated response at the appropriate scale, which should include supporting Mali in the reconstitution of its armed forces, promoting development and strengthening resilience, as well as ensuring the Joint Force of the
Group of Five for the Sahel is provided with sufficient resources to be an effective instrument in restoring stability in the Sahel.

A. Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

4. On 22 March, the signatory parties adopted a road map for the implementation of the timeline agreed at the session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee held on 16 January. The road map identifies priority actions to be undertaken in the short to medium term for the implementation of the Agreement and for the creation of conditions conducive to the holding of peaceful and credible presidential elections. It has led to the establishment of the mixed units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Kidal and Timbuktu. The registration of combatants who are eligible for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme is ongoing. The integration of combatants of armed groups into the Malian armed forces that was scheduled to commence on 25 April has been postponed to mid-June, with its completion anticipated by the end of August.

5. From 23 to 26 March, the Prime Minister travelled to Kidal, accompanied by my Special Representative for Mali, as well as to the Gao, Timbuktu and Mopti regions, to reaffirm the Government’s commitment to improving security and access to basic social services. The visit was perceived as a positive step in the peace process.

6. On 23 April, the Agreement Monitoring Committee met in a regular session to assess progress in the implementation of the road map. Positive developments included the high-level workshop on security sector reform held from 27 to 29 March, the allocation of funding for the interim authorities for operations and capital investments for the year 2018 and the identification of personnel for deployment to command positions in the Operational Coordination Mechanism sites in Kidal and Timbuktu. The Committee noted that agreement in principle had been reached on the provision of equipment, including collective weapons, to the Mechanism sites in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Furthermore, during the reporting period, the pre-registration of combatants in preparation for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process and for integration into the Malian defence and security forces continued, although the process was behind schedule.

7. On 28 May, the Agreement Monitoring Committee met to discuss the implementation of the Agreement, and noted, among other things, the positive progress made in the operationalization of the mixed units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Kidal and Timbuktu. At the same meeting, the representatives of the independent observer presented its first report to the Committee, which covered the period from 15 January to 30 April. In the report, the independent observer called upon the parties to focus on the core tenets of the Agreement and recommended a clearer communication strategy and the greater inclusion of civil society.

8. On 30 May, I participated in a high-level meeting with the signatory parties, the Prime Minister of Mali, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria and mediation partners. All participants highlighted the recent progress made on the operationalization of the security and political provisions of the Agreement. I was encouraged by the interaction and the renewed commitment between the signatory parties.

State authority and institutional measures

9. The construction of offices for the Governor and for the interim authorities in Taoudenni, the capital of the Taoudenni region, began on 5 April. Four water points
funded through the Peacebuilding Fund, six schools and two youth centres were built during the reporting period in various districts in the region. In addition, as at 15 April, the Government provided the interim administrations in the five northern regions with $21.7 million for operations costs and capital investments and to implement key projects under their respective priority action plans.

10. The number of judicial and prison officials deployed to northern and central Mali remained unchanged during the reporting period. The deteriorating security situation resulted in 6.5 per cent of appointed officials remaining in a jurisdiction other than their appointed ones.

11. The number of State officials redeployed to the northern and central regions increased by 11 per cent during the reporting period. As at 30 May, only 33 per cent of State officials were present at their duty stations in the northern regions and in the Mopti region. The Governor of Taoudenni, sworn in on 9 April, continued to work from Timbuktu pending the construction of offices in Taoudenni. The governors of all the other northern regions remained deployed to their respective duty stations.

12. The United Nations supported the elaboration of integrated security plans for the prisons in Bamako and Koulikoro and, on 31 March, finalized a project to improve the security and conditions of detention for suspected terrorists and other high-risk detainees at the Bamako central prison. The Mission trained 97 prison officers, 3 of whom were women, in prison management in Bamako and Gao.

Political developments

13. Whereas the Government postponed the regional, district and municipal elections scheduled for April to 2019, during the reporting period, it also took several measures to prepare for the presidential elections. On 23 April, the President of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, enacted the electoral law that had been amended, inter alia, to clarify voter identification requirements. On 27 April, the Council of Ministers set the 29 July as the date on which the electoral college would be convened. Also on 27 April, the electoral registry was declared satisfactory, following an audit by a committee composed of international and national experts, although the registry only included 27 per cent of citizens 18 to 23 years of age. On 29 April, 98 political parties, associations, public figures and activists launched a platform for political change, opposing the re-election of President Keita. As at 30 May, there are 22 candidates who have declared their candidature for the presidential elections, including the current President and Soumaila Cissé, the runner-up in the 2013 presidential election and leader of Union pour la République et la démocratie, the main opposition party.

14. The political opposition and civil society organizations criticized the Government for delays in conducting the reforms of the electoral system, claiming that their late implementation could have an adverse impact on the credibility of the elections. Opposition parties requested that the result of the elections be certified by the United Nations, however, because the certification of elections is not included in the mandate of MINUSMA, that request cannot be fulfilled. My Special Representative met with Malian officials and members of the political opposition, signatory armed groups and civil society to emphasize the importance of holding peaceful and inclusive elections within the time frame set in the Constitution. His good offices were also instrumental in facilitating the reform of the electoral law and MINUSMA will continue to provide support for the preparation of the elections, including technical, logistical and security support, within its existing resources and areas of deployment. However, the level of mistrust between the Government and opposition parties, which led to the organization of several demonstrations across Mali during the reporting period, constitutes a major source of concern ahead of the presidential election scheduled for 29 July.
15. On 3 April, the United Nations Development Programme established a new basket fund to support the electoral processes in Mali in 2018 and 2019. During the reporting period, MINUSMA provided electoral management bodies with technical, logistical, advisory and security support, including by introducing new electoral tools to strengthen the credibility and transparency of the electoral process.

16. The sustained advocacy efforts by MINUSMA and civil society notwithstanding, little progress was registered in ensuring the meaningful engagement of women in the peace process. Women’s organizations continue to be supported by the Mission in designing strategies to increase the representation of women in the peace process and in reconciliation efforts in central Mali.

Defence and security measures and reforms

17. A high-level workshop on security sector reform, sponsored by MINUSMA, was held in Bamako from 27 to 29 March; the outcome of the workshop was a revised draft of the national security sector reform strategy, which will be presented to the National Council for Security Sector Reform for validation in the first week of June. The signatory parties continued discussions on integration quotas and on the configuration of the territorial police.

18. On 11 and 12 April, the Technical Commission on Security met in Bamako under the chairmanship of the MINUSMA Force Commander. The signatory parties committed to providing heavy weapons to one company in each of the Operational Coordination Mechanism bases in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. Signatory armed groups provided the list of 51 combatants for the Mechanism site in Kidal on 23 April. Personnel and members of the command structure began deploying to the Kidal site on 7 May. On 24 May, the mixed units of the Mechanism in Timbuktu marked their official establishment in the presence of representatives of the interim authorities, regional civil and military authorities, armed groups, civil society and MINUSMA. As at 30 May, a total of 128 combatants were registered at the Kidal site, and 47 at the Timbuktu site.

19. The pre-registration of eligible combatants for the cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and integration into the Malian defence and security forces, was due to be completed on 28 April. Signatory parties have requested a one-month extension to complete the process, however, owing to alleged logistical and security constraints.

20. During the reporting period, MINUSMA supported the implementation of the laws on military orientation and programming, internal security and the internal and democratic oversight of security institutions, through the provision of capacity-building, training, infrastructure rehabilitation, equipment and technical advice.

21. The Mission continued to coordinate operations with the Malian armed forces at the national and regional levels, in line with the memorandum of understanding between MINUSMA and the Government. It expanded coordinated activities throughout the central region, including patrols in Nampala and Léré and civil-military cooperation activities. The Mission also shared information with the Malian defence and security forces, within the limits of its mandate, for the protection of civilians and for the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel. The Mission continued to revise the memorandum of understanding to include operational and technical aspects of support, in addition to capacity-building.
B. Provision of support to the Malian defence and security forces

22. In cooperation with other international partners, MINUSMA continued to provide technical assistance for the Malian Specialized Judicial Unit against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime. On 23 March, the Mission signed an agreement with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to support jointly support the Specialized Judicial Unit through the provision of equipment and training.

23. During the reporting period, the Mission and partners trained 896 members of the Malian security forces, 45 of whom were women, from Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Bamako on various policing modules and on human rights, and 35 others, 12 of whom were women, from Timbuktu and Bamako on child protection.

24. On 30 March, the Mission completed a training course for 13 Malian military engineers in explosive ordnance disposal. The Mission also continued to mentor the national police improvised explosive device disposal team and rehabilitated four armouries in the Gao and Timbuktu regions.

C. Regional developments

25. MINUSMA continued planning its support to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and deployed logistics personnel to Joint Force headquarters in Sévaré to ensure closer coordination. The operationalization of the Joint Force had incurred some delays. Although States members of the Group of Five have designated their respective troops for the Joint Force, not all of them have been deployed, and the deadline for the Joint Force obtaining full operational capability has been postponed from March to a later date. On 3 May, the United Nations received the first tranche of funds from the European Union, providing for the Mission’s support to the Joint Force in line with Security Council resolution 2391 (2017). Assessments of the six Joint Force camps on Malian territory in the central sector conducted by MINUSMA and the Group of Five are still ongoing, with a view to determining the level of engineering support required for the rehabilitation and fortification of these camps, and it should be noted that MINUSMA will need significant additional funding to carry out that construction work.

III. Major security developments

26. During the reporting period, the security situation remained of grave concern. The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims, in particular, continued to attack MINUSMA, the Malian defence and security forces and international forces across central and northern Mali, with the Mopti and Séguo regions affected the most. The group’s attack on the MINUSMA and international forces camps in Timbuktu on 14 April demonstrated its ability to plan and execute increasingly complex operations. The precarious security situation was compounded by repeated clashes between the Dogon and Fulani communities in central Mali, as well as violent incidents mainly targeting Tuareg communities in the southern Ménaka region. The trend of the increasing use of improvised explosive devices in the Mopti region was confirmed at the beginning of the reporting period; such attacks having caused the death of an unprecedented number of civilians. Armed groups also continued to threaten local populations against cooperation with security forces.
A. Asymmetric and other attacks

27. During the reporting period, armed groups conducted 44 attacks: 18 against the Malian defence and security forces, 12 against MINUSMA, 3 against MINUSMA contractors, 8 against signatory armed groups, 1 against Operation Barkhane and 1 against both MINUSMA and Operation Barkhane. The highest number of attacks was carried out in Mopti (13), followed by Kidal (10), Gao (7), Timbuktu (5), Ségou (5) and Ménaka (4). The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims was very active in the Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu regions and claimed most of the asymmetric attacks conducted during the reporting period. During the reporting period, 4 peacekeepers were killed and 24 injured, whereas 4 peacekeepers were killed and 12 injured in the previous reporting period. Six MINUSMA contractors were killed, compared with one in the previous reporting period. Ten Operation Barkhane forces were injured, and two were reportedly killed and three injured in the previous reporting period.

28. Malian forces were heavily targeted, but the number of victims decreased: 5 soldiers were killed and 19 injured, compared with the 45 killed and 80 injured in the previous reporting period. Attacks against the Malian security and defence forces were most heavily concentrated in Mopti (11), followed by Ségou (4) and Timbuktu (3). Moreover, a series of clashes in the Ménaka region between signatory armed groups and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara resulted in 19 members of the signatory armed groups being killed and 15 injured, compared with 20 members killed and 12 injured in attacks in the previous reporting period.

29. Since the beginning of 2018, the number of improvised explosive device incidents almost doubled, compared with the same period in 2017, with 93 incidents as at 18 May, compared with 55 incidents in 2017. As the increasing threat of improvised explosive device incidents expands towards more populated areas of central Mali, civilians are increasingly affected.

B. Protection of civilians

30. In the centre of Mali, the protective environment continued to deteriorate during the reporting period, in which at least 43 civilians were killed and 24 injured in targeted attacks and intercommunity conflicts, and many more were temporarily displaced. All districts of Mopti region, especially Koro district, as well as Niono and Macina districts of Ségou region, were affected by instability. On 28 March, only two days after the visit of the Prime Minister, a woman was injured in an attack on a hotel in Bandiagara district, where such occurrences of violent incidents had been rare so far. Communities not previously targeted by radical armed elements also came under attack, including: Bozo fishermen in Djenné and Ténenkou districts in three separate incidents in March, and on 14 April, two traders of the Diokaramé ethnic group were abducted in Mopti district, allegedly for having collaborated with Malian forces. Malian civilian authorities continued to be targeted, such as on 20 March, when a local electoral commission official was murdered in Niono district.

31. In response to the deteriorating security situation in the centre of the country, on 14 April, the Prime Minister instructed that civilians in the central region in possession of firearms were to be disarmed, including those who held licences. Furthermore, in early May, two Malian forces helicopters were put on standby in Mopti, while Malian defence forces patrols were deployed to affected localities of Koro district. Those positive measures notwithstanding, mounting allegations of summary executions and abuses by members of the Malian defence and security forces continued to be reported and to have an impact on their ability to restore stability. Notably, the implementation of a ban imposed on the use of motorbikes and
pickup trucks in the Mopti region and parts of the Ségou region led to targeted operations, in which some cases of excessive use of force and summary executions were reported, such as in the alleged cases of excessive force that resulted in the killing of two Fulani herders by the Malian armed forces on 28 April in Ténenkou district.

32. From 25 to 28 March, MINUSMA conducted Operation Faden, which enabled a joint civilian team’s missions to five localities in Koro district for the purpose of improving their situational awareness, including on the rollout of the Government’s plan to secure the centre. From 18 to 24 April, Operation Foronto facilitated similar joint civilian missions to four localities in the Mopti district.

33. A reconciliation mission led by the Ministry of National Reconciliation and Social Cohesion travelled to the Mopti region from 21 to 26 March. A commission was established by the Government to follow up on the mission’s recommendations, which focused on improving protection, initiating dialogue with radical elements and revitalizing youth employment.

34. In late April, a series of violent incidents occurred in the Ménaka region, near the border with the Niger. On 26 and 27 April, two violent incidents in the Aklaz and Awakassa settlements resulted in the killing of at least 47 civilians and the displacement of around 300 others. On 1 May, 17 civilians were reportedly killed in the locality of Tindinbawen. The victims of those incidents, mostly from the Dawashak Tuareg community, were reportedly targeted in an act of reprisal following operations conducted in the area by a coalition of armed groups. In the same period, incidents of retaliatory violence against Fulani communities were reported on the Niger side of the border, resulting in further casualties.

IV. Human rights situation

35. During the reporting period, MINUSMA documented 344 cases of human rights violations and abuses, involving at least 475 victims, compared with 133 cases and 483 victims in the previous reporting period. There were, inter alia, 239 cases of extrajudicial execution or other arbitrary killing, 25 cases of abduction or enforced disappearance, six cases of torture or ill-treatment and 42 cases of unlawful detention. Members of the Malian defence and security forces were involved in 58 violations. Signatory groups and non-signatory or splinter groups were responsible for 43 and 105 cases of human rights abuses, respectively. The Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims and other similar groups were responsible for a total of 138 cases, 90 per cent of which occurred in the Ménaka Mopti and Ségou regions. In addition, two cases of conflict-related sexual violence in the Gao region were documented.

36. On 19 May, elements of the Malian armed forces under the command of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel reportedly killed at least 12 civilians during an operation carried out in retaliation for the killing of one of their elements in Boulikessi, Mopti region. At the request of the Chief of Staff of the Joint Force, the Mission is providing support to the Joint Force in conducting an in situ investigation into those incidents. On 9 May, the Prime Minister reiterated that abuses against the civilian population would not be tolerated by the Government.

37. MINUSMA investigated serious allegations of violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law in the context of counter-terrorism operations undertaken by the Malian armed forces in the Mopti and Ségou regions, including allegations of 44 summary executions and three enforced disappearances in Bimbéré-Tama, Diankabou, Dioura, Mondoro, Ouro-Guiré and Sokolo communes. The Mission issued two public statements expressing concern over the grave human rights
violations by the Malian armed forces and informed the Government of its readiness to support investigations.

38. As a result of a cycle of violence in the Mopti region, and after having conducted an investigation, the Mission concluded that traditional hunters in Koro and Bankass (Koro district) had burned down three villages and attacked two others, and that intercommunity conflict in the same area had caused the death of at least 12 people and the forced displacement of hundreds, affecting at least 30 villages. The Government issued two public statements committing to undertaking criminal investigations into those allegations.

39. MINUSMA also investigated allegations of grave human rights abuses by the coalition of the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad and Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés in the Niger border area of Ménaka region. The Mission concluded that at least 143 civilians had been killed by the armed groups, houses had been burned and hundreds forcibly displaced, including 695 from Aklaz and Awakassa villages.

40. During the reporting period, more than 640 individuals appeared before the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission. As at 30 May, the Commission reported that it had received a total of 8,273 depositions since 3 January 2017. No progress was made, however, in the Sanogo trial or the trials of the alleged perpetrators of conflict-related sexual violence in 2012 and 2013.

41. During the reporting period, MINUSMA assessed the level of implementation of the human rights due diligence policy in Mali to be relatively low, given that about one fifth of the recommended measures to mitigate the risk of violations had been implemented by the recipient entities. The measures include the opening of investigations in Timbuktu in a case of sexual violence and in Bamako in a case of summary execution, and the dismissal of two members from the Operational Coordination Mechanism site in Gao.

42. The country task force on monitoring and reporting verified 49 grave violations against children. Ten children were killed and nine maimed in the Kidal, Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu regions; seven children were separated from armed groups in the Ménaka, Mopti, Gao and Timbuktu regions and are now following a reintegration programme in Bamako and Gao; there were 13 cases of attacks and threats against schools and hospitals; and 10 cases of denial of humanitarian access.

43. In March and April, the Mission delivered training courses on human rights for 352 members of the Malian armed forces, the gendarmerie and the police force; on child protection for 35 members of the Malian armed forces; on monitoring and reporting on grave violations against children in periods of armed conflict for 27 national and international partners; and on receiving and referring victims of sexual violence for 14 gender focal points from the national police. From 5 to 11 April, the Mission and national partners organized a sensitization campaign on HIV/AIDS and human rights, reaching 320 people, 201 of whom were tested for HIV. In addition, from 7 to 15 May, they provided a sensitization briefing on HIV prevention and conflict-related sexual violence to 951 women and girls in Mopti and Timbuktu, 789 of whom were tested for HIV.

V. Humanitarian situation

44. The humanitarian situation continued to worsen, owing to growing insecurity in the northern and central regions, limited State presence and insufficient funding for meeting current needs, while concerns over the looming agropastoral and nutrition crisis deepened.
45. At the end of March, the humanitarian outlook for the lean season (June through September) was worse than had been projected in late 2017, owing to the impending agropastoral and nutrition crisis, with 4.3 million people expected to be food insecure during the lean season in 2018, compared with 4.1 million projected in late 2017. Almost 1 million people will require emergency food assistance, a 55 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2017. The projected number of children suffering from global acute malnutrition increased from 622,000 to 856,000 between 2017 and 2018. During the reporting period, the United Nations and its partners supported the Government in providing food assistance to 155,000 people per month. The humanitarian response plan for 2018, which is aimed at providing lifesaving assistance to 1.56 million people, had received only 24 per cent of the $263 million required as at 30 May.

46. During the reporting period, 50 security incidents, mostly involving break-ins at compounds and vehicle thefts, affected humanitarian actors, compared with 41 cases in the previous reporting period. In response to the expansion of the threat of improvised explosive device incidents in central Mali, the Mission provided awareness-raising training to 155 drivers from humanitarian non-governmental organizations and private companies operating in the Gao and Mopti regions on the threat of improvised explosive devices.

47. As at 23 May, the Government had registered 60,600 internally displaced persons, 590,800 returnees and 576 asylum seekers, compared with 47,700 internally displaced persons, 589,600 returnees and 554 asylum seekers in January 2018. Although Mali hosts 19,374 refugees from various countries, more than 137,697 Malian refugees remain in neighbouring countries.

48. As at May 2018, 750 schools remained closed in the Kidal, Gao, Ménaka, Timbuktu, Mopti and Ségou regions, owing to insecurity, including threats and attacks from violent extremists, compared with 715 schools in March 2018. As a result, 225,000 children were denied access to education. In response, 50 community learning centres were created by the United Nations Children’s Fund and its partners in the Gao and Mopti regions, providing informal education in a safe environment for up to 2,500 children.

VI. Economic development and cultural preservation

49. During the reporting period, the Mission supported the Government’s plan for securing the centre of the country through quick-impact projects and the provision of institutional support to regional authorities. On 29 March, MINUSMA, together with the Government and the United Nations country team launched a Peacebuilding Fund project targeting women and young people in central Mali. The project was developed in line with the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, and aims at funding innovative projects for 500 young people, with a view to strengthening social cohesion in the Ségou and Mopti regions. Another Peacebuilding Fund programme was launched on 26 April in Dori, Burkina Faso, to promote community security, social cohesion and resilience in the Burkina Faso, Mali and the Niger cross-border area.

50. MINUSMA and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization continued to raise awareness of the need to safeguard cultural heritage, to combat the illicit trafficking of cultural goods and to provide support to cultural, artistic, educational and rehabilitation projects.
VII. Conduct and discipline

51. During the reporting period, one allegation of sexual abuse was reported to the Mission, against a former local individual contractor. The case was referred to the Office of Internal Oversight Services and the national police. One case reported in January 2018 is pending investigation with the Office. Administrative measures have been taken, pending the outcome of the investigation. Two allegations received in 2017 are pending investigation by the relevant troop-contributing country and the Office. MINUSMA continued to implement the three-pronged strategy for combating sexual exploitation and abuse, through enforcement measures, assistance to victims and training and outreach activities to inform personnel and the local population about the United Nations policy of zero tolerance of sexual exploitation and abuse.

VIII. Environment

52. During the reporting period, the Mission focused on systemizing the collection of environmental management data, to improve performance measurement, and made progress towards reducing energy inefficiencies by using smart meters for power generation, LEDs and solar street lighting. The use of recycled water processed through treatment plants in the Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu supercamps significantly reduced their water requirements, and solid and biomedical waste continued to be partly recycled or treated prior to disposal. Contractual services are being sought for hazardous waste management.

IX. Independent strategic review of the Mission

53. Against the backdrop of the mixed progress and deteriorating conditions in Mali described above, an independent strategic review of MINUSMA was conducted in early 2018, at my request. The review team, led by Ms. Loj, was comprised of experts from various United Nations entities. The review consulted a broad cross-section of stakeholders and visited Mali, including the Bamako Gao, Kidal and Mopti regions, from 14 to 25 March.

A. Findings and recommendations of the independent strategic review

Findings

54. With regard to the political situation, the assessment of the review team was that, in the three years since the signing of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, it had not resulted in enough meaningful progress on the ground. Furthermore, the presence of the State had declined compared with the previous year (20 per cent of sub-prefects were deployed in the north of the country at the commune level in 2017, compared with 36 per cent in 2016). The review team attributed that situation to insufficient ownership of the Agreement by the Malian people, trust deficits between the signatory parties and an uneven political will. The review team also highlighted a need for a clear connection between parties to the Agreement and key constituencies of Malian society, including women. It concluded, however, that, in the absence of an immediate viable alternative or the inclination to determine one, the Agreement remained a valid framework for engagement with the parties to the peace process, and that its implementation must be leveraged and accompanied by broader political efforts by Malian, regional and international actors. Challenging the Agreement or reopening it would create a dangerous vacuum.
55. With regard to the security environment, the review team took note of the fact that it had worsened since the signing of the Agreement. In its assessment, the review team found that the violence had evolved into a war of attrition, primarily targeting State representatives, MINUSMA and international forces, while divisions among communities had deepened. The review team also noted that the complexity of the composition of armed groups and the grievances of their members must be taken into account in finding appropriate responses. In its view, parties had shifted their focus away from the implementation of the Agreement to the protection of their equities in the north, having an impact on the progress made in the implementation of defence and security reforms.

56. The review team found that the threats against civilians were insidious and sophisticated, in particular in the centre of the country, where intercommunal tensions were being instrumentalized and extreme forms of Islamic law imposed, resulting in serious human rights violations. Compounding the situation was the fact that the majority of the reported human rights abuses committed by State actors took place in the context of counter-terrorism operations. The assessment of the review team was that growing instability in central Mali must be addressed through a multidimensional approach focusing on conflict resolution and confidence-building measures, accompanied by the gradual return of a legitimate and accountable State, would bring long-term stability to the central regions.

57. Therefore, the review team confirmed that the situation in the central regions was a serious source of concern, with the potential for further spillover if not carefully addressed. They suggested that there was a tendency to associate the worsening situation only with the expansion of the influence of terrorism and organized crime from the north; local dynamics and fundamental causes of instability, such as the multiplicity of localized conflicts over resources and land, climate change, the growing population and power struggles, must be taken into account. The review team observed that, to address the situation, a truly integrated plan that takes into account the collective of the security, governance, reconciliation and development aspects, was needed.

58. The review team confirmed that the immediate and regional neighbours to Mali are an inextricable part of the political dynamics in the country, in particular in the northern regions, and integral to the solution to the challenges facing the country. On the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the review team considered that its achievements could be limited, at least initially, if its capacity limitations were not urgently addressed. They also underlined the need for a clear regional political framework, including on how to best support the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali by leveraging the influence of the country’s neighbours on the signatory parties.

59. As the sole entity with a presence across northern and part of central Mali, and owing to the constraints and delays encountered in carrying out the process envisioned in Security Council resolution 2295 (2016) for the restoration and extension of State authority to the central and northern regions, the assessment of the review team was that MINUSMA had been called upon to undertake a variety of tasks, including having become a logistics and security enabler for non-United Nations security actors. The review team was of the view that the proximity of MINUSMA, and its support role and cooperation with security actors, including counter-terrorism actors, had contributed to the perception that the Mission was engaging in counter-terrorism actions. The review team noted that MINUSMA faced a dilemma between the need to reform and reconstitute the Malian defence and security forces and simultaneously support the existing forces in addressing the current situation of instability.
The assessment of the review team was that the Mission faced difficulties in balancing the safety and security of personnel, with operational reach. According to the review team, some 70 per cent of the casualties sustained by the Mission had been in the context of attacks either on the force protection of bases and infrastructure or during logistics convoys. On average, 80 per cent of the resources of the MINUSMA force were being employed to provide pockets of security covering a radius of 5 to 20 kilometres, protecting major population centres in the north. The review team estimated that chronic mobility shortfalls and the operational environment would likely continue to challenge the Mission’s ability to project its presence and implement its mandate, and therefore called for greater prioritization of tasks.

In terms of development and humanitarian efforts, five consecutive years of growth in the gross domestic product of Mali notwithstanding, the assessment of the review team was that peace dividends had yet to materialize in the north of the country. In fact, poverty had increased and basic social services in areas above the Niger River belt remained largely inaccessible. The closure of 35 per cent of schools in the northern and central regions, high rate of youth unemployment and perceptions of injustice had contributed to the population’s vulnerability to radicalization. Humanitarian needs had been approaching levels similar to those at the peak of the crisis in 2012. Some 4.3 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance in 2018 to date (up from 3.8 million in 2017), with a looming food security and nutrition crisis. The number of people facing severe food insecurity had increased by 55 per cent, relative to the lean season in 2017, and the severity of conditions had deepened. In addition, over 2 million people continued to be affected by a lack of access to water, sanitation and hygiene and health services. Absent State institutions and resources, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations remained the main provider of basic services.

The review team noted the significant role of the informal and illicit economy and traditional trans-Saharan trade routes in influencing conflict dynamics. It was the review team’s assessment that control over routes had exacerbated competition and the shifting of alliances among armed groups and communities, at times resulting in local arrangements that obviated or superseded the Agreement. A deep understanding of the political economy, including organized crime networks, was therefore required in order to define effective strategies to support long-term peace and stability. The review team noted that, although the Agreement focused on historical disparities, it also contained governance and economic reforms that had nationwide implications. Without ignoring the specific needs of the north, which needed to be addressed, the review team suggested that the Agreement should be part of a comprehensive national vision for peace, reconciliation and development for all Malians.

In that complex environment largely dominated by security actors, the review team was of the view that the United Nations system in Mali had been challenged in its efforts to fully leverage the comparative advantages of MINUSMA and specific agencies, funds and programmes and to deliver as one. The review team took stock of the limited presence and operational capacity of the United Nations country team in conflict-affected areas, and given that limited presence, MINUSMA had therefore increasingly played a role in project implementation in humanitarian and development areas, a situation that should be reversed. Furthermore, the review team took note of the complicated policy environment, in which multiple national development plans and coordination mechanisms, and the frequent turnover of key Government counterparts, had an impact on priority-setting and coordination. That environment, coupled with dwindling funding for the humanitarian response plan and development assistance framework had limited the scope of humanitarian and development impact.
Recommendations of the independent strategic review: prioritization and implementation of the Mission mandate

64. It was the review team’s assessment that, although the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali remained the valid framework, it needed to be accompanied by sustained political momentum and leveraged to promote trust-building between the north and south of the country, the centre and the periphery and key constituencies across Mali, in particular women and young people. MINUSMA had a key role to play in that respect, and the review team recommended that the Mission’s role should be more directed towards a broadened political one, including: (a) rallying a common vision among regional and international actors in support of the peace process and stabilization; (b) developing a pact for peace between the Government, the Security Council, the United Nations and international partners, under which assistance would be associated with clear benchmarks, including regarding progress on good governance and political reforms; and (c) supporting a national dialogue to foster ownership of the Agreement by the Malian people and to strengthen Malian nationhood beyond State reform.

65. The review team indicated that MINUSMA, with international partners of Mali and the United Nations country team, should reprioritize its actions to focus on political tasks, including through the development of a political strategy that focuses the Mission’s activities towards the implementation of key provisions of the Agreement, including decentralization, the effective establishment of legitimate State presence, security sector reform and reconciliation. In central Mali, the focus should be on conflict prevention and resolution at the local level and contributing to the protection of civilians through dialogue, community outreach and policing, as well as efforts to create a protective environment. The Mission should orient its resources and efforts according to those priorities. Activities that do not respond to those priorities and good offices requirements should be staggered in their implementation or phased out.

66. As part of the refocusing of the Mission’s role on political issues, the review team emphasized that the Mission should also support the long-term goal of addressing governance deficits. They indicated that the redeployment of reformed and reconstituted Malian defence and security forces is crucial to restoring security. Other governance functions, including the delivery of basic social services and political participation, in particular through decentralization, at the core of the Agreement are also key to building and strengthening the legitimacy of the State in the northern and central regions.

67. The review team suggested taking a more realistic approach to the objectives set for the MINUSMA force, given its limitations. To further reinforce its prevention and conflict resolution efforts, MINUSMA must tailor its approach to the protection of civilians around community engagement and policing, violence reduction and institution-building, including with a greater articulation of the work of the different components of the Mission to that end. In that regard, the MINUSMA force should direct its efforts towards creating space for the civilian component of the Mission to deliver on its mandated tasks. More specifically, in the centre of the country, that recalibrated approach should be part of a multidimensional United Nations strategy that would include an adequate uniformed presence.

68. Recognizing that addressing instability requires a coherent comprehensive and integrated approach to tackling all dimensions of insecurity, including the effective reform of the Malian security institutions, the review team recommended that supporting security sector reform should feature among the chief political endeavours of MINUSMA. The Mission should rally international partners around a common vision for rebuilding the Malian security sector, a task that operationally extends
beyond the life cycle of a peacekeeping mission. Its role should be that of establishing a clear link between the political efforts geared at advancing security sector reform and the operational and technical support being provided to the reconstituted and reformed Malian forces by international partners of Mali. That should be underpinned by the active coordination between the various actors involved and seeking innovative approaches to address the shortcomings of interim security and defence measures.

69. The review team was of the view that the Mission should continue its valuable monitoring, investigation, advocacy and reporting on the human rights situation and provision of support to the training of the Malian forces aimed at promoting the full respect of human rights standards, in particular when conducting counter-terrorism operations. The review team recommended that the Mission strengthen its cooperation with the Malian authorities so as to support investigations of and follow-up to allegations of human rights violations, while enhancing its public human rights reporting, in particular with regard to the situation in the central regions.

70. The review team stressed the importance of strengthening and enhancing collaboration between the United Nations country team and MINUSMA in supporting the restoration of governance functions, recommending the development of an integrated strategic framework setting the United Nations overall vision and joint priorities for sustaining peace in Mali, which should be followed by the revision of the United Nations Development Assistance Framework after the presidential elections. The review team recommended the development of the Mission’s implementation strategy requested by the Security Council in its resolution 2364 (2017) on the basis of those two processes. The review team suggested that MINUSMA should continue to focus on the political and security components of the Agreement, recalibrating its programmatic activities and its use of quick-impact projects to bring them in line with those priorities, whereas the United Nations country team should take the lead in humanitarian, recovery, development and peacebuilding efforts. The review team also called upon the United Nations country team to enhance its presence in the north and centre of the country.

71. The review team recommended that the United Nations establish clear parameters on service provision to non-United Nations entities. Such parameters would help to preserve and enhance the Mission’s impartiality and its political space. Furthermore, accountability mechanisms and access for human rights actors for timely human rights monitoring should be preconditions for any United Nations support. The review team emphasized the importance of the Mission continuing and strengthening its implementation of the human rights due diligence policy. With regard to the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel specifically, the review team concurred with my earlier recommendation that support to the Joint Force be provided through an assessed contributions-based support package, distinct from MINUSMA.

72. Against the recommendations above pertaining to the Mission’s mandate, the review recommends the realignment of United Nations peacekeeping efforts whereby MINUSMA would refocus on its core political tasks. In that regard, the footprint of the Mission would be adjusted in Sector North and reassessed across the country to allocate more resources to the direct implementation of Mission priorities and to support an increased civilian presence in the centre of the country, with a view to taking a more balanced strategy there. A tailored approach to the protection of civilians would be adopted, and its military and police components would be leveraged to create the maximum space for others to operate. The current overall uniformed personnel ceiling would remain unchanged, although the military component would be slightly adjusted through consolidation of bases to create the space for one additional formed police unit and 10 individual police officers in the centre. The consolidation of bases would also be aimed at reducing the exposure of
the Mission, in particular of convoys, to attacks. Taking note of the proposed pact for peace, I suggest that, building on the existing benchmarks and road map, this would serve as a tool for the periodic review of the footprint of the Mission against the achievement of core priorities and of overall United Nations engagement.

B. Mandate renewal

73. The independent strategic review team has accurately portrayed the political and security dynamics at play in Mali and the operational environment in which MINUSMA operates.

74. In my view, the recommendations for a shift in focus, prioritization and implementation of the Mission’s mandated tasks would maximize the Mission’s role in support of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali and in amplifying the peace process. They take into consideration the comparative advantages of the Mission, notably its good offices, and of the United Nations system as a whole, while factoring in the constraints posed by the operational theatre in Mali and the difficulties in generating resources for United Nations efforts. As such, I encourage that they be taken into account in the Security Council’s deliberations on the Mission’s mandate renewal, as well as in the strategic planning documents that guide both the Mission’s engagement on the ground and its cooperation with other actors. Prioritizing and staggering the implementation of tasks are key to furthering peace in response to the specific conditions in Mali, yet it must be borne in mind that reforming institutions takes time and is the primary responsibility of the people and Government of Mali.

75. I intend to explore ways of broadening the political role played by MINUSMA in support of the peace process, in line with the recommendation in the strategic review on the elaboration of a pact for peace. Such an initiative would take into account the existing benchmarks and road map agreed upon between the signatory parties and MINUSMA and help to consolidate momentum towards the implementation of the Agreement by enhancing political dialogue. It would also potentially reinvigorate the commitment of international and regional partners in support of the peace process. Moving forward, and as mentioned during my recent visit, the Mission’s political role should be further enhanced in support of the key political and security reforms that are provided for in the peace agreement, in parallel to ongoing efforts by the Mission, together with other partners such as the European Union, to support the redeployment and professionalization of the Malian defence and security forces.

76. The period leading up to the presidential elections in July and its immediate aftermath will be critical for sustaining the political momentum surrounding the peace process and the parties’ engagement in the implementation of the Agreement. In that context, it should be acknowledged that the signatory parties have shown tangible signs of their determination to move forward in the implementation of the Agreement, with some concrete steps taken during the reporting period. Furthermore, and as acknowledged by the review team, the Agreement can lay the foundation for lasting peace, provided that sustained political will by the parties allows for building on the gains secured through the implementation of the key institutional reforms undertaken. The Agreement also remains the only viable avenue for a constructive dialogue, and, as such, it should be leveraged by the parties, MINUSMA and the international community to build a stronger, more inclusive and sustainable peace process that would deliver long-awaited peace dividends to the Malian people.

77. In the light of those considerations, it is my view that a reconfiguration of the posture and focus of MINUSMA, as outlined in the recommendation of the review team, would be the most appropriate course of action at the present juncture. The
decision to pursue further adjustments of the footprint of the Mission would be
determined by progress made on good governance and institutional reforms,
measured through the benchmarks of the pact for peace and an assessment of the
practical modalities and operational implications of their implementation.

X. Observations

78. As witnessed during my visit to Mali from 29 to 30 May, in particular in my
meeting with the signatory parties and mediation partners, progress has been made in
recent months on the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation
in Mali, notably the adoption in March of a new road map for its implementation,
which takes stock of the delays accumulated to date and what can concretely be
achieved prior to the presidential elections. I welcome the recent establishment of the
mixed units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism sites in Kidal and Timbuktu,
the pre-registration of combatants, and the visit of the Prime Minister to the northern
regions, including his visit to Kidal. Those efforts demonstrate that progress is
possible if there is political will and dialogue. The signatory parties should capitalize
on those steps to prompt concrete change on the ground.

79. The holding of inclusive, transparent and credible elections will be critical to
securing the gains achieved to date by the parties in the implementation of the
Agreement and to building on them. It is crucial that all parties work together to
ensure that conditions are met for the elections to be conducted in a peaceful
environment. I welcome the electoral reforms undertaken by the Government of Mali
and the demonstration of goodwill by all parties in supporting the electoral process
so far, including through the priority actions included in the road map adopted on
22 March. It will be important for the Government, supported by MINUSMA, to
create conditions conducive to the holding of secure, peaceful and transparent
elections. That includes establishing a meaningful dialogue with the political
opposition and civil society on the electoral process.

80. I am concerned by the continued deterioration of the security situation in central
Mali, characterized by an increase in the complexity of attacks against MINUSMA,
the Malian armed forces and international forces, an unprecedented number of
civilian casualties and a rise in intercommunity clashes. I was informed that security
incidents have increased by 200 per cent during the past year, with over 1,000
incidents registered by MINUSMA in the Mopti region and dozens of people killed.
Failure to contain the crisis in the central regions could have a serious impact on the
stabilization of the country as a whole and on social cohesion, and could reverse gains
realized to date. This should be the priority of the Government, in particular with a
view to securing the elections.

81. In that context, I would like to thank the independent strategic review team, led
by Ms. Loj, for its work. Its findings and recommendations will guide the Mission’s
mandate renewal and help to ensure a better alignment of the Mission’s objectives
and strategic vision with the political and security context in Mali, as well as with the
Mission’s available resources. Although adjusting the mandate might present some
challenges, given that the presidential elections are to be held in one month, it should
also be welcomed by national and regional partners as encouragement to redouble
efforts towards the consolidation of peace. It is also an acknowledgment of our
continued engagement in Mali.

82. The Mission’s mandate renewal must be accompanied, however, by a clear
message that concrete progress in the implementation of the Agreement must be
achieved and accelerated alongside a national dialogue, following up on the
conference of national understanding held in March 2017. In that respect, it is time to
start a frank and constructive dialogue. I welcome the proposal of the strategic review team for the Government of Mali, the Security Council, the United Nations and international partners to develop a pact for peace, taking into account the existing benchmarks and road map, for which assistance and progress in terms of governance, political reforms and the implementation of the Agreement are measured against benchmarks. The pact will also ensure strategic coherence and the complementarity of actions by partners of Mali towards common objectives. This will guide United Nations engagement, according to progress made on the political and security domains, and could lead to further adjustments being made to MINUSMA.

83. Five years after the establishment of MINUSMA and three years after the signature of the Agreement, Mali is at crossroads. I am concerned by the findings of the independent strategic review team, which have highlighted the complexity and fragility of the situation, as well as the challenging operational environment in which MINUSMA operates. The security situation has deteriorated, and divisions among communities have deepened, affecting national social cohesion and neighbouring countries. Some recent progress notwithstanding, if unchanged, in the long term, keeping the current pace of implementation of the Agreement risks undermining its credibility and its potential as a tool for lasting peace.

84. MINUSMA continues to face a critical shortfall in equipment, which significantly limits its ability to implement its mandate. The speedy provision of military helicopters to the Mission will be instrumental ahead of the upcoming elections and the start of the rainy season. I encourage Member States to move forward with the concept of equipment-contributing countries, should the Mission’s troop- and police-contributing countries not be in a position to provide the required equipment in accordance with their memorandums of understanding signed with the United Nations.

85. The context in Mali underscores the importance of having a shared vision of peacekeeping based on a realistic assessment of what is achievable and needed by the people. With almost 174 Mission peacekeepers killed, 101 of whom were killed in hostile action, since the establishment of the Mission, and limited progress made on the ground, the current situation is not sustainable. Efforts to implement the recommendations of the report on improving the security of United Nations peacekeepers, as well as to strengthen the security of MINUSMA premises, are underway. I commend MINUSMA, international forces and the Malian defence and security forces for their courageous and effective response to the 14 April terrorist attack in Timbuktu.

86. The allegations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in the conduct of counter-terrorism operations in central Mali and the Ménaka region are of concern. MINUSMA stands ready to support the authorities in carrying out investigations and calls for those responsible for those violations to be held to account. I urge international and national forces to ensure that military operations are conducted in accordance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

87. During my visit to the Mopti region, I was made keenly aware of the depth of the agropastoral and nutrition crisis, in a context where the number of people in need of emergency food assistance has doubled over the past year. The dire food situation, which is likely to further deteriorate absent an early response at the required scale, requires the urgent mobilization of the international community. I also encourage all partners to focus their efforts on improving the humanitarian situation and access to basic social services and creating income-generating opportunities to address the growing concerns regarding unemployment, marginalization and exclusion, which continue to fuel recruitment by violent extremist elements.
88. Continued concerns were expressed during my visit about the spillover of the insecurity on neighbouring countries. I remain fully supportive of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, which remains a fundamental aspect of the multidimensional response required to address instability in the Sahel. MINUSMA stands ready to provide operational and logistical support to the Joint Force, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2391 (2017). I continue to hold the view, however, that stronger support to the Joint Force, including with predictable and sustainable financial resources, is critical to ensuring the success of that initiative.

89. I welcome the report of the independent observer, and the observations therein on the implementation of the Agreement during the period from 15 January to 30 April. The work of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali and the application of the tools available to it, together with the efforts of the independent observer, in addition to the benchmarks that would be tied to the pact for peace, will hopefully contribute to increasing momentum on the implementation of the Agreement, as well as to the broader peace process and needed institutional and governance reforms. They will also inform an objective assessment of the progress realized. I call upon the Security Council to support my recommendation, as well as the proposed priorities and staggering the implementation of the Mission’s mandate, as informed by the strategic review.

90. In conclusion, I wish to reiterate that the Agreement remains the cornerstone of the peace process in Mali, its potential to spur national dialogue and governance reform, with a beneficial impact beyond the northern regions, is undoubted, and MINUSMA has a key role to play in supporting it. In that regard, I recommend that the mandate of MINUSMA should be extended for another year, until 30 June 2019, it being adjusted according to the priority areas and with a configuration as proposed in the strategic review and outlined in my recommendation above. The Mission’s posture would then be kept under regular review in the light of the evolution of the peace process.

91. I commend my Special Representative, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, and all United Nations entities operating on the ground, including humanitarian actors who operate in a very challenging environment, for their service. I am grateful to the international mediation team, including the lead mediator, Algeria, regional and international organizations, including the Group of Five for the Sahel, the European Union, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, non-governmental organizations and all other partners for their support towards the restoration of peace and stability in Mali.
### Annex I

**Military and police strength of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali as at 22 May 2018**

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Police</th>
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<td>Staff officers and in units</td>
<td>Individual police officers</td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Total** | 11 845 | 324 | 12 169 | 249 | 56 | 305 | 1 367 | 69 | 1 436 | 1 616 | 125 | 1 741