Situation in Mali

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. By its resolution 2640 (2022) of 29 June, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) until 30 June 2023 and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council every three months on the implementation of the resolution. The present report covers developments in Mali since the previous report (S/2022/446), issued on 2 June 2022.

II. Major political developments

2. The reporting period was characterized by important political advances in relation to the strategic priorities of MINUSMA. The agreement between the Malian authorities and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the extension of the transition time frame led to the partial lifting of the sanctions imposed on Mali and revitalized the reform process. The holding of the long-awaited high-level decision-making meeting gave rise to consensus among the parties on key pending aspects of the peace process. In the centre of the country, while insecurity continues to undermine the restoration of State authority, the adoption by the Government of the strategy for the stabilization of the central regions was an important step. Its full implementation would enable a holistic response to the prevailing situation.

A. Political transition

3. In its final communiqué, issued following its sixty-first ordinary summit, the Authority of Heads of State and Government took note of the transition timetable submitted by the Malian authorities, which extends the transition until the end of March 2024. On that basis, the Authority decided to lift the economic and financial sanctions imposed on 9 January 2022 while maintaining certain institutional sanctions and sanctions against individuals and groups. This decision is the result of extensive discussions at the extraordinary summit of ECOWAS on 4 June and subsequent efforts by the ECOWAS Mediator for Mali – the former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan – and the local transition follow-up committee (comprised of the African Union, ECOWAS and MINUSMA) to reconcile the request of Mali for a 24-month
extension of the transition with the earlier pronouncements of the ECOWAS Authority on the matter.

4. The agreed way forward was set against the backdrop of a decree of 6 June signed by the transitional President, Colonel Assimi Goïta, formalizing a 24-month extension of the transition, starting on 26 March 2022. Although the extension was criticized by both the ECOWAS Commission and some Malian stakeholders as unilateral, it was complemented by a series of decisions by the transitional authorities. On 10 June, the transitional President issued a decree by which he established a commission tasked with preparing and submitting a preliminary draft constitution to be considered by the Council of Ministers later in 2022. Appointed on 29 June, the 25 members of the commission, including 5 women, have initiated a series of consultations with a broad range of stakeholders, including political parties, civil society organizations and signatory movements. They also held consultations in the regional capitals with the vital forces of the nation, made up in particular of representatives of political parties, civil society and armed groups involved in the peace process, with the logistical support of MINUSMA, as well as in the district of Bamako.

5. The adoption of the Electoral Law by the National Transition Council on 17 June, with 115 members of 121 voting in favour thereof, represented another milestone. The transitional President promulgated the law on 24 June. With the exception of the Mouvement du 5 juin-Rassemblement des Forces patriotiques, which challenged the new law on procedural and substantive grounds, political and civil society stakeholders, as well as the signatory movements, welcomed it, highlighting the inclusive approach adopted by the Council. It should be noted that some provisions of the text, in particular those pertaining to the majority voting system, should facilitate women’s representation in the National Assembly, in compliance with Malian law No. 2015-052, by which a 30 per cent minimum quota of women in national institutions was established. From 12 July to 2 September, the Council, with the support of MINUSMA and the United Nations country team, disseminated the Electoral Law in the 19 regions and the district of Bamako.

6. On 28 June, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization convened a meeting of the national consultative framework on the reform and electoral processes. Several political party leaders attended the meeting, viewing it as a timely initiative to foster dialogue. The framework, which is a long-standing mechanism on electoral matters, had not met since 4 March 2021. Its format had been expanded through a ministerial decision on 22 June to include discussions on political and institutional reforms.

7. In parallel, on 17 June, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation convened a meeting with the local transition follow-up committee to discuss the monitoring mechanism for the return to constitutional order. On 22 June, a joint ministerial order was signed, creating the Commission for the Monitoring of the Timetable for Political and Institutional Reforms under the aegis of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization. The Commission consists of a two-tier mechanism: the Steering Committee, which is to meet on a monthly basis and includes the relevant Malian ministers and representatives of ECOWAS, the African Union and MINUSMA; and the Technical Committee, which is to meet weekly and is composed of experts from the above-mentioned entities. The progress reports of the Commission will guide further decisions of the ECOWAS Authority.

8. On 23 and 24 June, the ECOWAS Mediator visited Bamako to assess progress towards the return to constitutional order, including the mechanism to monitor the implementation of the electoral timetable. Following the discussions with the Mediator, it was agreed that the envisioned monitoring mechanism would be
complemented by regular visits of the Mediator and the reactivation of the transition support and follow-up group led jointly by the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS and Mali.

9. The visit of the Mediator and his subsequent report provided the basis for the decisions taken at the sixty-first ordinary summit in Accra. On that occasion, the Authority of Heads of State and Government took note of the strides made by Mali, endorsed the joint monitoring and follow-up mechanism for the implementation of the transition timetable and decided to lift the economic and financial sanctions that had been in place since 9 January 2022. The individual sanctions imposed on 7 November 2021 and the suspension of Mali from ECOWAS decision-making bodies were maintained pending further progress on the transition. The Authority further reaffirmed that, in conformity with the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the Transition Charter, no member of the transitional authorities shall be allowed to participate in elections held to restore the constitutional order.

10. Following the summit, efforts to operationalize the Independent Authority for Election Management continued. The Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization consulted political parties, on 21 July, and civil society representatives, on 22 July, to discuss the board nomination procedures of the Independent Authority. However, amid a lack of consensus on selection modalities, the Ministry proceeded with the drawing of lots for the 15 positions and, on 22 August, representatives of political parties and civil society organizations were shortlisted. Some major political parties refused to participate in the draw, arguing that the chosen methodology contravened the Electoral Law.

11. The Commission for the Monitoring of the Timetable for Political and Institutional Reforms was launched in Bamako on 21 July, in the presence of the ECOWAS Mediator, with the holding of an inaugural meeting of the Steering Committee. The Technical Committee held its first meeting on 25 August, while the Steering Committee convened its second session on 31 August. In addition, the transition support and follow-up group convened its third meeting, held in Lomé on 6 September.

12. The transitional authorities have pursued a broader reform agenda, in line with the recommendations of the national dialogue on reform, which they deem necessary to address the long-standing governance deficiencies of Mali. This includes the adoption, on 15 June, of the revised strategic framework for the rebuilding of the State for the period 2022–2031 and its associated action plan for 2022–2026. An independent monitoring and evaluation committee was created by the transitional President on 29 June to follow up on the recommendations arising from the national dialogue. The 34 members of the Committee, including 6 women, officially assumed office on 19 July. Furthermore, on 21 July, the transitional President signed a decree expanding the membership of the National Transition Council by 26 seats, in line with the revised Transition Charter, which had been approved in February 2022.

13. On 22 August, the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, Colonel Abdoulaye Maïga, was appointed interim Prime Minister. This followed the announcement of 13 August that, owing to health reasons, the Prime Minister, Choguel Kokalla Maïga, had taken a leave of absence owing to illness.

B. Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

14. In a context marked by the slow implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, MINUSMA continued to engage with the transitional authorities and signatory movements, including within the framework of the international mediation. Efforts were focused on securing the holding of the high-
level decision-making meeting, as decided during the forty-fifth session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee, on 5 October 2021.

15. The high-level decision-making meeting was held in Bamako from 1 to 5 August. The opening and closing ceremonies were presided over by the Prime Minister, in the presence of several ministers, the High Representative of the transitional President for the implementation of the Agreement and the leaders of the signatory movements. The members of the international mediation team and the Independent Observer were also in attendance. The Malian parties agreed on the integration, in two phases, of 26,000 ex-combatants into the national defence and security forces and the public administration: 13,000 (including the 3,000 already part of the accelerated disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process) in 2023, and the remaining 13,000 in 2023 and 2024. They also agreed to establish an ad hoc commission to formulate concrete proposals on ranks and the chain of command within the national defence and security forces and on the integration of senior civilian officials of the movements.

16. To accelerate the implementation of political and institutional reforms, the transitional Government outlined the measures to be taken to enact the reforms that do not require constitutional revision, relating notably to decentralization, territorial policing and the resourcing of local government. The Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad committed itself to submitting a memorandum articulating its position on the reforms. In addition, it was agreed that the Government would take the follow-up measures necessary for those reforms that required constitutional revision as part of the ongoing elaboration of a new constitution.

17. The technical security commission, under the chairmanship of the Force Commander of MINUSMA, met on 18 August. The commission recommended the prompt launch of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, the full operationalization of the reconstituted battalions in Kidal, Gao, Timbuktu and Ménaka, and the establishment of a joint observation and verification team for Ménaka. In addition, a ministerial-level session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee was held on 2 September, following a hiatus of almost one year. The participants welcomed the agreement reached by Malian parties at the high-level decision-making meeting and endorsed the appointment of an additional 15 women to the Agreement monitoring mechanisms, increasing the representation of women in the Committee from 31 to 38 per cent. The meeting signalled the resumption of the regular functioning of the bodies charged with implementing the Agreement.

18. At the local level, MINUSMA supported the Ministry of Justice in organizing expert-level consultations regarding the draft law on the constructive complementarity between formal and traditional justice mechanisms, including the role of customary religious authorities, in line with article 46 of the Agreement.

C. Stabilization and the restoration of State authority in the centre

19. While the Malian Defence and Security Forces continued to conduct military operations aimed at stabilizing the centre of the country, the overall security situation remained of deep concern. Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and affiliated groups remained the major source of insecurity, further complicating the return of State authority and the provision of basic services for populations. As at 31 August, the presence of administrative State authorities (governors, prefects and sub-prefects) at their duty stations in Mopti and Ségou reached 26 per cent (29 of 110 officials), compared with 19 per cent at the end of April 2022. On 28 July, the Council of Ministers appointed 189 sub-prefects (including 19 women), of whom 23 are to be
deployed in the Ségou and San regions and 27 in the Mopti, Bandiagara and Douentza regions.

20. MINUSMA continued its integrated support for the development of a comprehensive strategy for the stabilization of the centre. From 6 to 10 June, with MINUSMA support, the Cadre politique pour la gestion de la crise du centre held consultations in the Bandiagara, Mopti and Ségou regions involving stakeholders from various locations. The draft strategy and its action plan for 2022–2024 were discussed at the Council of Ministers on 15 June and adopted on 24 August. MINUSMA, in coordination with the United Nations country team, has aligned its support plan with the priorities identified.

21. In the lead-up to the adoption of the strategy for the stabilization of the centre, MINUSMA continued to provide capacity-building in the areas of the rule of law and criminal justice. In June, the Mission supported the visit of the Ministry of Justice to Mopti to improve working conditions and strengthen the effectiveness of institutions and personnel, one of the priorities of the action plan of the Government. Moreover, from 27 June to 1 July, the Military Tribunal of Mopti, operational since 2020 with MINUSMA support, held its second hearing, during which 29 misdemeanour cases involving 34 defendants were examined. In August, MINUSMA facilitated three judicial hearings in the Douentza region, during which 16 cases were heard.

22. The Mission supported the improvement in prison conditions and the strengthening of security to reduce the risk of riots and of radicalizing detainees. Technical assistance was provided to reinforce prison security in the centre through a simulation exercise in Mopti that brought together 80 representatives of the Malian Defence and Security Forces from Mopti, Douentza and Bandiagara. Furthermore, the Koro prison, built with MINUSMA support, became operational.

D. Regional developments

23. Following their decision of 15 May to withdraw from the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Malian authorities confirmed the end of the assignments of the personnel serving in the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel in sector West in Néma, Mauritania, and in sector Centre in Niamey, which took effect on 14 June. The headquarters were relocated from Bamako to N’Djamena on 30 June. Subsequently, the Mission terminated its operational and logistics support for the Malian battalions. Diplomatic efforts to re-engage Mali on the Group of Five for the Sahel have not yielded results.

24. Cross-border cooperation diminished while the security situation in the tri-border area continued to deteriorate. The midyear trend shows a high increase in civilian casualties. The death toll for just the first half of 2022 represented more than 90 per cent of the annual toll for 2021. Armed extremist groups have increasingly targeted infrastructure, encircling major cities and blocking major access routes.

III. Major security developments and response of the Mission

25. The security dynamics were marked by a spike in the activities of extremist elements affiliated with Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, leading to increased threats against civilians and attacks on the Malian Defence and Security Forces and MINUSMA. In addition, insecurity has continued to expand to the west and south of the country, where Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and unidentified elements carried out attacks.
26. In response to the situation, MINUSMA has conducted several operations, detailed below, with a focus on enhanced cooperation with the Malian Defence and Security Forces, including joint protection activities, capacity-building and the supply of fuel for the reconstituted battalions in Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal and Ménaka, in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces. As at 4 September, United Nations police had conducted 175 joint patrols with the Malian Defence and Security Forces, including 58 joint patrols in the Mopti region. Three weekly joint long-range patrols with the national defence and security forces were conducted along the Sévaré/Bandiagara axis, and regular joint patrols were being carried out in Gao, Goundam, Ménaka, Sévaré and Timbuktu, creating a more secure environment for the population.

27. Furthermore, MINUSMA supported the deployment of Malian security forces to the Gao, Mopti and Timbuktu regions through the construction of dormitories, in order to improve conditions for women police and gendarmerie personnel and strengthen gender-related capabilities. To address the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, the Mission provided technical assistance to the Permanent Secretariat to Counter the Illicit Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in order to establish a database for information collection and analysis. In addition, the Mission continued to provide technical expertise to the Permanent Secretariat with regard to weapons and ammunition management.

**Central Mali**

28. In the centre, three major factors explained the volatility of the security situation. First, the rainy season and related operational constraints undermined the ability of the Malian Defence and Security Forces to sustain security in the aftermath of military operations to free areas from the presence of extremist groups. Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin and affiliated combatants have exploited this gap to impose “survival pacts” on communities, through which they enforce strict social and political norms, in particular in northern Djenné cercle, eastern Bandiagara, Bankass and Douentza. In addition, the groups impede access to fields and resupply roads, further undermining the livelihoods of vulnerable populations. Notwithstanding the presence of Malian Defence and Security Forces in the communes of Boni, Hombori, Kerena and Mondoro, the Katiba Serma group affiliated with Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimim imposed a blockade of commercial activities in the Douentza cercle, between 25 May and 1 September, preventing freedom of movement on the Douentza-Hombori-Gossi axis through attacks against vehicles, as was the case on 2 August, when 19 commercial trucks were burned. The blockage was eventually lifted following negotiations between Boni community representatives and members of the armed group.

29. Second, reprisal attacks targeting communities for their alleged cooperation with the Malian Defence and Security Forces increased. On 18 June, elements from Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin conducted attacks against the villages of Diallassagou, Dianweli and Dessagou, in Bankass cercle, which resulted in approximately 130 victims, according to the Malian authorities. Many civilians fled, seeking shelter and access to basic supplies in nearby urban centres. Overall, nearly 9,000 internally displaced persons fled to Bankass city and 800 others to Mopti.

30. Third, attacks against Malian forces in urban centres continued, with Katiba Macina claiming responsibility for six coordinated attacks on 21 July, in the Mopti, Douentza, Ségou and Koulikoro regions, which resulted in 3 Malian soldiers killed and 17 others injured. The following day, Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin attacked a military base in Kati, 15 km from Bamako. On 27 July, additional coordinated attacks by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin were carried out in Sévaré (Mopti region), Sokolo (Ségou region) and Kalumba (Nara region). Malian
forces confirmed that 3 civilians and 15 soldiers had been killed, with a further 25 soldiers injured.

31. Against these multifaceted challenges, MINUSMA sustained mission-wide initiatives to protect civilians. It stepped up efforts to protect bridges and secure vital infrastructure between Sévaré and Bandiagara, including securing the ongoing rehabilitation of the Yawakanda and Songo bridges with funding through a quick-impact project. The Mission also continued patrols and maintained a static force presence in Sévaré, and between Douentza and Petaka, to facilitate freedom of movement and ensure the continuation of economic activities. Similarly, the MINUSMA temporary operating base in Ogossogou and regular patrols supported safe access for civilians to the Bankass market and to agricultural lands, after civilians had been prevented from gaining access to those locations for fear of reprisal from extremist elements. Following attacks by Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin, on 18 June, MINUSMA provided casualty evacuations for and logistical assistance to Malian forces and accompanied Malian authorities on several fact-finding and conciliatory missions to Ségué and Diallassagou in order to assess violations and engage with local communities. In addition, MINUSMA deployed a quick reaction force, establishing a temporary operating base to protect civilians from further attacks and allowing injured civilians to receive medical support.

32. MINUSMA further supported the protection of civilians through local mediation efforts. Intercommunal dialogues to address conflicts between Fulani and dozo communities were held in the Niono and Macina districts in the Ségou region in June and July, facilitating the voluntary return of internally displaced persons.

33. In June, a four-month pilot project to sustain civil-military dialogue between the Malian Defence and Security Forces and communities was concluded in Douentza and Hairé. The project led to positive outcomes, including the request from communities that Malian forces set up checkpoints at the entrance of Boni, as well as the establishment of a community liaison committee with an early warning function.

34. Lastly, MINUSMA organized workshops on countering violent extremism and preventing radicalization in Fana, Koutiala and Douentza on 14 and 15 September, as well as a training workshop for 300 religious leaders in Mopti and Ségou from 6 to 13 September. The workshops are aligned with the national policy on countering violent extremism.

Northern Mali

35. In the Gao and Ménaka regions, active fighting among extremist groups near populated areas has been the primary protection concern, as well as growing instances of their intimidation of communities to consolidate influence. Islamic State in the Greater Sahara remains a key perpetrator of violence, with attacks and threats in multiple areas of the Djebok and Gabero communes in Gao district, Talataye and Tin Hama in Ansongo cercle in the Gao region, and Anderamboukane, Emis Emis and Inékar in the Ménaka region. On 14 July, elements from the Dawsahak community loosely affiliated with Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin repelled an offensive by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara near Talataye.

36. In the broader Gao region, on 18 June, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara attacked several settlements in the Anchwadj commune, reportedly killing 35 civilians perceived to be supportive of the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés. Between 27 and 30 June, MINUSMA conducted long-range patrols reaching Djebok and Tin Hama in order to protect civilians in the Anchwadj commune, after populations had fled to Gao owing to threats from extremist elements. Following attacks by extremist groups on 18 July, MINUSMA peacekeepers were deployed to the village of Todyel to deter further violence against civilians. Similarly,
on 25 August, MINUSMA launched its early warning and rapid response mechanism following the intimidation by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara of three settlements near Tin Hama village, which triggered the displacement of more than 500 villagers. MINUSMA conducted several deterrence flights from 28 to 31 August and deployed a quick reaction force to one of the settlements under threat, where peacekeepers also provided medical assistance to civilians. On 29 June, one Malian soldier was killed in an attack by unidentified elements at a checkpoint in Wabaria, approximately 10 km south of Gao town. Moreover, on 5 July, two peacekeepers were killed and five others injured in an improvised explosive device attack near Tin-Aouker, in Bourem cercle. On 21 August, a MINUSMA convoy came under direct fire in the same cercle, resulting in the death of a civilian contractor. On 7 August, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara staged a complex attack on a military post of the Malian Defence and Security Forces in Tessit, Ansongo cercle, killing 42 soldiers and civilians. In addition, 22 Malian soldiers were injured and promptly evacuated as casualties by MINUSMA.

37. In the Ménaka region, confrontations between Islamic State in the Greater Sahara and signatory armed groups resulted in a high number of civilian casualties and displacement. On 4 June, the Groupe d’autodéfense des Touaregs Imghad et leurs alliés and the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad des Daoussak unsuccessfully attempted to dislodge combatants of Islamic State in the Greater Sahara from Anderamboukane, on the border with the Niger. The deployment, in early June, of Malian Armed Forces reinforcements to Ménaka town and the endorsement by the authorities on 12 July of a new security arrangement are yet to translate into a significant improvement in the situation. On 23 July, elements of the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad des Daoussak allegedly tried to extort a group of mostly Songhai students returning to Gao after the completion of examinations in Ménaka. The situation triggered a violent protest, which left three civilians dead and three others injured. MINUSMA and Malian forces promptly interposed themselves between the communities and prevented the angry crowd from reaching the internally displaced persons camp, where members of the Dawsahak communities had settled. One peacekeeper was injured and three MINUSMA vehicles were damaged. In addition, the Mission provided medical assistance to and the subsequent evacuation of three injured Malian soldiers.

38. In response to increasing security threats, MINUSMA has reinforced patrolling within the city, with two daily and two overnight patrols, as well as regular long-range patrols around Ménaka. Joint patrols with Malian security forces are conducted twice per week. Moreover, following alerts of threats by armed extremist groups against Tin-Fadimata, Afoulane and Imache villages, MINUSMA provided a force presence in those localities to pre-empt threats and protect civilians. Since 25 August, the Mission has also been conducting deterrence flights over the Ménaka region. These efforts were complemented by community dialogue, through support for the local High Islamic Council, in a bid to promote region-wide reconciliation campaigns among communities. Nevertheless, as at 6 September, 25,539 internally displaced persons were being hosted in Ménaka, which has led to tensions over water, food, medical supplies and farmland in the area.

39. In the Timbuktu region, violent extremist groups continued their campaign to expand control and influence, including through improvised explosive device attacks and ambushes against MINUSMA and the Malian forces. On 19 June, Malian forces launched an operation that included air strikes against presumed elements of Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin in Eban Imalane (Gourma-Rharous). On 1 July, a mortar attack by unidentified individuals targeted the Malian military camp in Acharane, Timbuktu cercle. On 23 June, a MINUSMA vehicle hit an improvised explosive device approximately 12 km south-west of Ber, Timbuktu cercle, injuring
eight peacekeepers. On 2 September, the MINUSMA camp in Ber came under a complex attack, causing significant material damage.

40. MINUSMA conducted 847 foot patrols and 669 mounted patrols in the Timbuktu region. Regular and robust operations aimed at maintaining a secure environment for protecting civilians, ensuring freedom of movement, stabilizing population centres, providing assurance of the presence of MINUSMA and deterring the activities of violent extremist groups. In addition, the operations supported the deployment of a joint assessment mission in Ber, on 12 August, to engage with the local population, evaluate protection threats and assess potential support for communities. The Mission continued to implement awareness-raising initiatives to foster social cohesion in Timbuktu city and Goundam, as well as conflict prevention activities through community dialogues in Tin Ag Elhadj and in Touwal, in the Taoudenni region, on 15 and 16 June, respectively.

41. In the Kidal region, on 19 June, a peacekeeper succumbed to his injuries after his vehicle hit an improvised explosive device 2.4 km south-east of the MINUSMA Kidal camp. On 30 June, two peacekeepers were injured when a MINUSMA vehicle escorting civilian personnel struck an improvised explosive device in Kidal town. Also in June, MINUSMA commenced joint force and police patrols to increase situational awareness, strengthen liaison with communities and deter attacks against MINUSMA. Joint patrols were also conducted in Tessalit and Aguelhok.

42. Following the outcome of the high-level decision-making meeting in Bamako, MINUSMA organized two workshops in Tessalit and Kidal between 20 and 25 August to raise the awareness of signatory and non-signatory groups regarding the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process.

43. MINUSMA continued to implement its action plan for communities affected by attacks in Aguelhok in 2021. On 12 August, the Mission handed over eight quick-impact projects and community violence reduction projects for income-generating activities benefiting 1,200 women and 96 young people. Moreover, in June, pipe-borne water supply projects were handed over to communities, reaching 660 beneficiaries and indirectly supporting 18,000 people.

IV. Human rights situation

44. The situation has continued to be characterized by alleged violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated by extremist armed groups (297), self-defence militias (23), signatory armed groups (27) and unidentified armed elements (3). MINUSMA documented 55 alleged violations attributed to the Malian Defence and Security Forces, accompanied in some instances by foreign military personnel, during the conduct of military operations in the centre. On 31 August, the Mission released its quarterly note on trends in human rights violations and abuses covering the period from April to June 2022.

45. MINUSMA documented 405 alleged human rights violations and abuses, a 40 per cent decrease compared with the previous reporting period (684). Overall, 302 civilians were killed, 47 were abducted or missing and 56 were injured. There were numerous cases of arbitrary arrest and detention, notably in connection with military operations (181). Most of the alleged violations and abuses occurred in the central regions of Bandiagara (106), Ménaka (70), Ségou (42), Mopti (40), Gao (35), Koulikoro (19), Timbuktu (17), Koutiala (10), Douentza (4), Kayes (4) and San (4). In a new development, MINUSMA observed an increase in armed attacks targeting
civilians in southern regions. Following the attacks, cases of arrest and detention and allegations of enforced disappearance were noted.

46. The Mission has 32 ongoing human rights investigations across Mali. MINUSMA has continued to be denied access to people arrested by the Malian Defence and Security Forces in relation to military counter-terrorism operations, making it impossible for the Mission to visit specific detention centres in Bamako, Mopti and Gao.

47. The authorities continued to reaffirm their commitment to the efforts to combat impunity, making multiple announcements of the opening of investigations into allegations of human rights violations, including those attributed to the Malian Defence and Security Forces. To ensure continued support for the transitional Government on human rights-related issues, MINUSMA provided awareness-raising sessions for military and police officers. Similar support was provided to the Justice, Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the organization of its fifth public hearing on women victims of sexual violence and children victims of conflict. In addition, the Mission provided support to the Constitutional Court in promoting the integration of human rights throughout constitutional reforms.

48. Logistical and operational support for the Malian Defence and Security Forces continued to be subject to the human rights due diligence policy. MINUSMA conducted a series of conferences on the policy for 253 people, including 138 members of the Forces in the regions of Gao, Kidal, Ménaka, Mopti and Timbuktu.

49. The United Nations recorded a decrease in allegations of grave violations against children (369) compared with the previous period (447), directly affecting 301 children. The alleged violations included recruitment and use (192), killing and maiming (73), sexual violence (13), abductions (50), attacks against schools and hospitals (16) and denial of humanitarian access (25). Verified incidents that may constitute violations of international human rights law against children occurred in the Ménaka (130), Bandiagara (81), Mopti (48), Ségou (28), Kidal (26), Gao (24), Douentza (19) Timbuktu (6), Sikasso (4) and Kayes (1) regions and were attributed mainly to unidentified armed elements (92), as well as Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wal-Muslimin (88), an undetermined branch of the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad (72), the Plateforme (33), the Katiba Serma (21), the Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad (17), the Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad des Daoussak (17), the Malian Defence and Security Forces (16), Islamic State of the Greater Sahel (10), clashes between the Malian Armed Forces and armed groups (4) and Dan Nan Ambassagou (1). Of the 192 children verified as recruited, 8 left the armed groups during the reporting period and 115 outside the reporting period, 17 were killed during military operations and 52 remain within armed groups and armed forces in Gao, Bandiagara and Ménaka.

50. Some 2,366 cases of sexual violence were recorded in the Gender-Based Violence Information Management System, including 299 conflict-related sexual violence cases perpetrated mostly by unidentified armed individuals, in the regions of Mopti (34 per cent), Gao (23 per cent) and Timbuktu (9 per cent). This represents an increase in conflict-related sexual violence cases of 40 per cent compared with the previous reporting period. Conflict-related sexual violence against girls constituted 26 per cent of all cases of sexual violence recorded. A total of 28 women and girls were abducted, and there were worrying reports of women being coerced into forced marriages in the Mopti region.
V. **Humanitarian situation**

51. The deepening of the protection crisis negatively affected the already dire humanitarian situation. The number of internally displaced persons rose from 350,000 to 397,000 in the centre and north of the country, while more than 175,000 Malian refugees were in neighbouring countries. More than 1.8 million people face severe food insecurity and 2 million children under the age of 5 are affected by acute malnutrition.

52. While humanitarian actors made significant efforts to provide identified internally displaced persons with food, shelter and health care, resource mobilization remains a key challenge. Under the 2022 humanitarian response plan, $686 million is required to assist 5.3 million people. As at 6 September, only 28 per cent ($192.2 million) of the required funds had been mobilized.

VI. **Economic development**

53. Inflation and commodities prices have continued to rise. The lifting of ECOWAS economic sanctions has enabled Mali to return to the regional capital market, enabling the country to issue bonds, the proceeds of which are expected to be used to clear arrears and to finance infrastructure and other development projects. In addition, Malian authorities have taken several initiatives to respond to the crisis, including the establishment of an interministerial follow-up committee to monitor measures for curbing pricing disparities and the launch of the 2022 national response plan to address food and nutritional insecurity. On 17 August, given a significant decrease in both State revenue and government spending, the Council of Ministers adopted a bill amending the Finance Law for the year 2022.

54. The trust fund in support of peace and security in Mali launched seven projects for a total of $3.5 million, aiding internally displaced persons in Bamako, rehabilitating civil infrastructure in Kidal and Gao Regions and boosting the inclusion of more women in the Agreement Monitoring Committee. In addition, the Mission funded six quick-impact projects for $181,000, providing training and infrastructure to Malian Defence and Security forces, support to local media, and water and sanitation infrastructure in Timbuktu and Kidal.

VII. **Operational challenges**

55. The withdrawal of the Barkhane force and the cessation of its support for MINUSMA further underlined the urgency of generating additional capabilities under the force adaptation plan and considering troop augmentation. Against a background of increasing risks, the persistent gaps in air assets, in particular armed helicopters in Gao and Kidal, remained a key challenge. Moreover, the building of infrastructure was delayed owing to the shortage of construction materials experienced during the ECOWAS sanctions. These challenges are compounded by the decision of the Government of El Salvador to end the deployment of its air support unit to MINUSMA in December 2022, although the country’s armed helicopters will remain. Similarly, the Government of Sweden will end its contribution in November, which will create significant gaps in the capabilities of the mobile task force.

56. On 13 July, the Government of Egypt informed the United Nations Secretariat of its decision to temporarily suspend all activities of its combat convoy battalion, citing losses incurred by its contingent: seven Egyptian peacekeepers had been killed to date in 2022. Notwithstanding significant supporting measures from the force, the
suspension was implemented immediately. While a surge in air operations and the reassignment of other units have enabled the Mission to maintain its supply chain, this is not sustainable and comes at the expense of other mandate priorities, especially the protection of civilians.

57. Three troop-contributing countries have instructed their individual police officers deployed outside Bamako not to leave the MINUSMA camps. Those caveats effectively end their contributions to all police-related activities in support of the population and the Malian Defence and Security forces.

58. On 10 July, the Malian authorities arrested 49 Ivorian soldiers at Bamako airport, seizing their armaments, accusing them of illegally entering Malian territory and classifying them as “mercenaries”. The Government of Côte d’Ivoire strongly rejected the accusations, stating that its soldiers had been deployed in support of a MINUSMA contingent. Following the incident, the Malian authorities, which had previously decided to suspend the rotation flights of contingents from the West African troop- and police-contributing countries in response to the ECOWAS sanctions, decided to extend the suspension to all MINUSMA contingents, affecting 5 formed police units and 13 force units. After discussions with the Malian authorities, an agreement was reached, leading to the resumption of the rotations, on 15 August. Given the significant backlog in rotations that has accumulated and the requirement for incoming units to familiarize themselves with the operating environment, there will be a three- to four-month period during which capabilities will be limited, which comes on top of the additional logistical challenges.

59. On 20 July, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation released a statement in which it invited the Mission's spokesperson to leave the country within 72 hours, citing “unacceptable publications” on social media related to the arrest of the 49 Ivorian soldiers. MINUSMA and the United Nations Secretariat expressed deep regret at the Government’s decision and recalled that the doctrine of persona non grata did not apply to, or in respect of, United Nations personnel.

60. Separately, the President of Togo, Faure Essozimna Gnassingbé, initiated diplomatic talks to secure the release of the 49 Ivorian soldiers. On 3 September, 3 women among the 49 soldiers detained in Mali were released “as a humanitarian gesture”.

Access and freedom of movement of mission personnel

61. MINUSMA continued to face restrictions on movement and access. It recorded 27 instances of ground restrictions: 16 imposed by the Malian forces, 4 by the gendarmerie, 5 by the local population and 2 by the dozo militia. Most restrictions were imposed in the centre, with 15 cases involving ongoing night-time restrictions along the Mopti-Sévaré axes and in Djenne for all MINUSMA movements and patrols. Five cases were recorded in Gao, three in Bamako and two in Timbuktu.

62. MINUSMA recorded 24 instances of air restrictions, with a notable shift to sector East, while most of the restrictions recorded during the previous reporting period had occurred in sector Centre. Most related to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations, in particular involving unmanned aircraft, although the restrictions also affected MINUSMA helicopter flights to a lesser extent. For example, on 30 and 31 August, restrictions on helicopter flights in the Ansongo and Ménaka regions were recorded following attacks by Islamic State in the Greater Sahara against positions of the Malian Armed Forces, which led to counter-offensive operations in the area. In addition, restrictions delayed the Mission’s response to the early warning alert in Tin Hama, postponing deterrence flights from 26 to 28 August.
External communications

63. Disinformation campaigns against MINUSMA persist across all types of media. They are often amplified through fake social media accounts. In response, the Mission has increased the consistency of its communication of factual and tangible actions to protect civilians and to support communities. The image of and appreciation for the Mission are dramatically different in regions where it is deployed and where its activities have a tangible and visible impact.

64. The strategy features an increased use of proxy communications, in which beneficiaries of MINUSMA activities share their testimonies. The activities are complemented by the United Nations Radio Mikado FM’s weekly programme “Le Vrai du Faux”, in which disinformation trending on social media is deconstructed.

Safety and security of United Nations personnel

65. MINUSMA continued to operate in an asymmetric threat environment. It suffered 21 explosive device attacks, including 7 in Gao, 6 in Kidal, 4 in Mopti, 3 in Ménaka and 1 in Timbuktu, resulting in 5 peacekeepers killed and 16 injured, compared with 18 attacks recorded during the previous reporting period. The deadliest attack occurred on 9 July, when the Egyptian convoy hit an improvised explosive device or mine in the vicinity of I-n-Aoukert village, resulting in two peacekeepers killed and five others injured. The Mine Action Service initiated a new advisory and training coordination mechanism in sector headquarters to ensure a robust and consistent approach to planning and training in order to mitigate explosive threats.

66. The forthcoming period may present additional risks for the safety and security of United Nations personnel. Under articles 11 and 7, respectively, of the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel of 1994, States parties are obligated to take all appropriate steps to protect United Nations and associated personnel who are deployed in their territory from violent attacks, as well as to prevent the commission of such attacks. In addition, pursuant to article 14 of the Convention, it is required that the State party in whose territory the alleged offender is present prosecute any cases of violence or attempted violence committed against United Nations and associated personnel. Mali has been a party to the Convention since 2 January 2008 and is subject to the obligations of the Convention, pursuant to the status-of-forces agreement.

67. The Board of Inquiry Unit completed 24 reports on 11 fatalities and 22 cases of serious injury or illness among mission personnel, of which 4 were the result of hostile action against MINUSMA, identifying important lessons for preventing a repetition of similar events.

68. MINUSMA launched an internal working group to enhance internal coordination and support in the investigation and prosecution of crimes against peacekeepers.

69. The Mission reinforced passive protective measures around United Nations premises, through the construction of overhead and sidewall panels to mitigate the risk of indirect fire in MINUSMA camps.

VIII. Capacities of the Mission

Military

70. As at 2 September, 12,158 military personnel were deployed, corresponding to 91.5 per cent of the authorized strength of 13,289 personnel, comprising 11,651
military unit personnel, 501 military staff officers and 3 contracted posts. Women accounted for 4.95 per cent of the military personnel.

Police
71. As at 5 September, 1,739 police personnel were deployed, corresponding to 90.57 per cent of the authorized strength of 1,920 personnel. Women accounted for 25.89 per cent of 309 individual police officers and 14.10 per cent of 1,430 formed police unit personnel.

Civilian personnel
72. As at 2 September, United Nations civilian staff numbered 1,787 personnel, corresponding to 90 per cent of the authorized strength of 1,977 positions, comprising 755 international staff, 856 national staff and 176 United Nations Volunteers. Women accounted for 26 per cent of civilian staff.

Performance
73. MINUSMA made further progress on its Action for Peacekeeping Plus commitments. It continued to build on the process underpinning the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System, including through the facilitation of a mission-wide performance assessment in July 2022 and the quarterly collection of data on the key objectives of MINUSMA. The performance assessment findings are serving to inform the results-based budget for 2023/24 and the development of the revised Mission plan for 2022/23, as well as ongoing efforts to adjust interventions in order to ensure optimal mandate implementation.
74. The MINUSMA police component continued to evaluate individual police officers and formed police units in order to enhance police performance. Evaluations of formed police units were conducted in relation to contingent-owned equipment, operational readiness, performance assessments and commanding staff performance. All units were found to be satisfactory. The Mission also evaluated the performance of 163 individual police officers through quarterly assessments.
75. The Mission conducted 34 performance evaluations using a combination of the military unit evaluation tool and the enterprise management feedback tool, as part of the regular evaluation plan conducted on a quarterly basis; 25 units exceeded the established standard and 9 met the standard. MINUSMA systematically initiated measures to strengthen performance for evaluations scoring 50 per cent or lower, including observations, details of shortfalls and recommendations, with a view to generating follow-up requirements for use by the unit commander in developing a military evaluation improvement plan to resolve the shortfalls identified in the evaluation.

Conduct and discipline
76. MINUSMA maintained efforts to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse among its personnel, including through training for mission personnel. The Mission conducted misconduct risk assessments and supported outreach to communities on the zero-tolerance policy and reporting mechanisms of the United Nations through helplines and focal points. No allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse were recorded during the reporting period.

Environmental issues
77. MINUSMA pursued environmental mainstreaming into activities through the screening and monitoring of site management. No major environmental risks were
reported for waste or wastewater management. Upgrade works funded by MINUSMA enabled the national agency for the management of wastewater treatment plants in Bamako to start admitting sewage sludge.

IX. Observations

78. While Mali continues to face huge challenges, the past months have seen some progress. Going forward, it is critical to build on this, with the ultimate objective of putting the country on an irreversible path towards sustainable peace, security and stability, in line with its people’s long-held aspirations.

79. The agreement between Mali and ECOWAS on the timeline for the completion of the transition and on the related monitoring mechanism was a milestone and paved the way for the lifting of the financial and economic sanctions. I commend ECOWAS and the regional leaders for their steadfast engagement. I note the close coordination on the ground between the representatives of ECOWAS, the African Union and my Special Representative for Mali, within the framework of the local follow-up committee, which greatly facilitated the work of the ECOWAS Mediator.

80. The adoption and promulgation of the Electoral Law, the ongoing operationalization of the single independent electoral management body and the formulation of a new constitution point to a new dynamic in the electoral and political process, which must be sustained, given the tasks ahead.

81. A key factor in the success of the electoral and reform processes will be the extent of the consensus built around them. In this respect, I am encouraged by the relaunching, by the authorities, of the consultative framework with the political parties and civil society actors, as well as by the inclusive approach that underpinned the adoption of the Electoral Law. The authorities are obligated to do all they can to foster consensus, including creating the necessary political space, but all stakeholders have a shared responsibility to facilitate the transition process. There can be no more compelling task for all concerned.

82. The holding, in August, of the high-level decision-making meeting on certain aspects of the peace agreement has rekindled hopes for decisive progress on this critical undertaking. The consensus reached on the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration quota and on the way forward for the required institutional reforms was long overdue. The peace agreement remains the best framework for addressing recurring conflict in northern Mali, in addition to being an essential component of the reform agenda devised by the national dialogue on the reform process. It is my hope that the Government and the signatory movements will expedite the work of the ad hoc commission tasked with providing recommendations on the integration of senior members of the movements, including in relation to the chain of command.

83. MINUSMA will continue to support the peace process, including within the framework of the international mediation. I pay tribute to Algeria, as the chef de file of the mediation, for its commitment to peace in Mali and welcome the outcome of the recently held session of the Agreement Monitoring Committee. The full functioning of the Committee and its subsidiary structures is critical to the close follow-up of the peace process and provides the parties with a forum in which to air their concerns and arrive at consensual solutions.

84. I remain deeply concerned by the evolution of the security situation against the backdrop of the reconfiguration of the international counter-terrorism efforts in the Sahel. The continued terrorist activities in the centre of Mali and in the tri-border area between Mali, Burkina Faso and the Niger, in particular in the Ménaka and Gao regions, including heightened competition between terrorist groups, have resulted in
a considerable number of civilian casualties and displacement, as well as in the
disruption of the livelihoods of already vulnerable populations. I strongly condemn
these attacks and those targeting the Malian Defence and Security Forces and
MINUSMA and reiterate the unwavering solidarity of the United Nations with Mali
and its people.

85. In this context, Mali has stepped up its efforts to address insecurity. At the same
time, and as experience has repeatedly shown, sustainable peace can be achieved only
if security operations are accompanied by equally resolute efforts to establish State
presence, including a justice system that is seen as being fair and effective, the
delivery of basic services, the promotion of intracommunal and intercommunal
reconciliation and the protection of human rights. I commend the Government for the
steps taken towards the redeployment of civilian administration personnel and for the
adoption of its stabilization strategy and action plan for the central regions.
MINUSMA and the United Nations country team will work closely with the
authorities to assist in those efforts, and MINUSMA will continue to support the
efforts of the Malian Defence and Security Forces in full compliance with the human
rights due diligence policy.

86. Similarly, military operations, including those conducted with bilateral partners,
must be carried out in compliance with international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, and perpetrators of violations and abuses must be held
to account. While the Mission’s recently issued quarterly note on this matter points
to a decrease in recorded violations and abuses, the overall situation remains very
concerning. I therefore urge the Malian authorities to redouble their efforts, building
on their stated commitment to upholding their international obligations. In this
respect, MINUSMA will continue its support for and constructive dialogue with the
Government.

87. The humanitarian situation in the country warrants a far greater international
mobilization than has been undertaken to date. With the humanitarian response plan
only 27 per cent funded, I call upon the international community to step up and meet
the needs identified. More generally, international support is required for the
implementation of the various processes under way in Mali. As central as they are,
Malian efforts cannot succeed without an accompaniment commensurate with the
tasks at hand. Advances in Mali will facilitate the stabilization of the Sahel region
enormously; conversely, a failure to stabilize the country would reverberate well
beyond the country’s borders. In this context, I will continue to encourage all efforts
aimed at building trust and cooperation between Mali and its neighbours and
international partners. In this regard, I reiterate my appeal for the release of the 46
Ivorian soldiers still detained by Mali.

88. MINUSMA remains a critical component of international solidarity with Mali,
delivering invaluable and multifaceted support to the country and its people. Two
factors are critical to the Mission’s success. First and foremost, full cooperation from
the Malian authorities is needed. The efficacy of the Mission is linked closely to the
level of facilitation that it enjoys from the authorities in terms of freedom of
movement and other related activities, in line with the status-of-forces agreement.
Impediments to the operations of MINUSMA in recent months have had a serious
impact on its ability to deliver on its mandate, especially the protection of civilians. I
urge the Malian authorities to give their full support to MINUSMA in its efforts to
assist them in achieving peace and stability in the country.

89. Second, there is an urgent need for MINUSMA to be provided with the
necessary capabilities, given the difficult operating environment, in particular the
asymmetric threat that the Mission is facing. The evolution of the security
environment requires the consideration of appropriate measures, including an
augmentation of the force in the short term, in line with what has already been agreed upon with the Malian authorities, pending the conclusions of the internal review of the Mission. Such an augmentation would enable MINUSMA to enhance its posture for the purpose of mandate implementation and the protection of its personnel and assets. I count on the continued support of Security Council members and troop- and police-contributing countries.

90. I once again express my deep appreciation to my Special Representative, El-Ghassim Wane, in addition to the personnel of MINUSMA, both national and international, for their commitment and hard work. I also express my appreciation to ECOWAS, the African Union and the European Union, as well as to the regional and international partners of Mali, for their contributions.
### Annex I

**United Nations Multi-dimensional Integrated Stabilization mission in Mali: military and police strength as at 16 September 2022**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th><strong>Military</strong></th>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Police</strong></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experts on Mission, Staff Officers and Units</td>
<td>Individual Police Officers</td>
<td>Formed Police Units</td>
<td>Total Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>1 129</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>1 165</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhutan</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>1 396</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1 450</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1 060</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1 064</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>615</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran (Islamic Republic of)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>321</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>222</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>943</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>486</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>684</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>261</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11798</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>12371</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>